Learning to live with China
Pragmatism not paranoia please
One issue has been preying on my mind for some time, but I haven’t plucked up the courage to write about it: China. That country looms large over every aspect of world affairs. They are neither friend nor enemy. With America retreating into itself, we in Europe need to temper our ideological repulsion of China with realism.
China, under Communist Party rule, is a very hard country to like. It wasn’t so very long ago that a self-loathing prevailed amongst Western chattering classes, which suggested that Western culture was fundamentally self-seeking and destructive (rationalised by one writer as “left-brained”), and that pretty much any other world culture was morally superior. This was a response to colonial depredation, and the edifice of racial prejudice that it was built on, together with the highly destructive industrial and commercial policies required to fuel the Western way of life. I think we’ve moved beyond that now, to appreciate that the Western culture we raged against was just one aspect of a much more general human condition. Now that Western culture is on the retreat, it is hard to say that what is taking its place is better. China is a case in point.
In China we see rampant racism and unembarrassed imperialism. While we in Britain agonise as to whether the Scots should be allowed another referendum on independence, the Chinese government feels that the colonial absorption of Xinjiang and Tibet, and the future absorption of Taiwan - none of which were any more part of the the Chinese heartland than Ireland was part of England’s - as part of its core national mission. Political dissent is suppressed ruthlessly. Criticism of the government, which has its fair share of corruption and incompetence, whether or not with constructive intent, is scarcely tolerated. Conservative social values, from sexuality to marriage, are imposed heavily. Religious practice must conform to party guidelines. Nobody in the West, on any part of the political spectrum, holds the country up as an example to be emulated. That’s quite something given the enormous economic success of the country.
On top of this China’s relations with the rest of the world are focused on narrow self-interest, tempered by grievance against the country’s unhappy encounters with Western and Japanese imperialism in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Its leaders openly sneer at the muddles of Western democratic ways. Of course none of this is unprovoked: the Chinese have had to endure generations of sneering by Western elites, and massive levels of hypocrisy as Western self-interest has been camouflaged by high-minded idealistic pronouncements. And those 19th and 20th Century troubles were for real. But, as my mother used to say, two wrongs don’t make a right.
It is interesting to view modern China in a historical context. I am indebted here to Michael Wood’s excellent book: The Story of China - a Portrait of a Civilisation and its People (2020). China’s history is a long one, with depth and achievements that easily compare to Western civilisation. It is right that Chinese leaders look back to this for identity and inspiration. It is a cycle of rise and fall, with threats mainly arising from the nomadic tribes to the north (that impacted the West as Huns and Mongols), and also from ruling dynasties turning in on themselves, leading to misrule. Totalitarianism from the imperial centre is a recurrent theme, and the Communist Party’s instincts here are strongly within Chinese historical tradition. But there is plenty for liberals to work on in Chinese history too. The peak of the Song dynasty at around the turn of the first Millennium was a particular example. Chinese culture has been enriched by the import of foreign ideas, notably Buddhism. The import of Western ideas in the last two centuries has been deeply influential too (including Communism, of course) - though the Chinese elite is clearly ambiguous about that.
Where does modern China sit in a historical perspective? Its Communist Party government sits squarely in a historical imperial tradition, and sees itself as having inherited the Mandate of Heaven. But the religious trappings that were such a deep part of ancient imperial tradition have gone. The structures of government are modern, owing much to the West and Russia (though the Chinese contribution to these must be acknowledged - in particular in the development of a meritocratic civil service). The empire’s geographical reach is nearly as far as it has ever been. It rules Xinjiang, Tibet, Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Taiwan - ethnically and culturally distinct - has slipped its grasp but China clearly wants to take it back. It used to have a political sway over Korea that it no longer has. But this is a bigger China than for almost all its history. The threat from the tribes to north is gone.
Also China is more open to the rest of the world than it has ever been. But that comes with an awkward corollary: it can’t think of itself as the world’s top dog, as it traditionally has, even in periods when this was questionable. Doubtless its leaders see the country’s main challenge is keeping foreign Western cultural influences at bay - as well as other foreign influences, such as Islam. The 19th Century, when the country was bullied and sneered at by Western powers, and used as an outlet for narcotics trade, rankles deeply. In a broad historical perspective, though, this arose at least as much from the internal weaknesses of the Qing dynasty, which refused to adapt as the world as it changed around it, as it was to any external aggression. China might easily have exploited the differences between the imperial powers: instead it drove them into an unholy alliance against it. If Japan could profit from the Western colonialists, then so could China. Things got worse in the 20th century, which was a period of civil war and then Japanese imperial aggression.
The current Chinese ruling class has a deep fear of the country sinking back into the chaos and disorder that has afflicted the country so often, especially in the last 200 years. It is continually adapting its ruling system to keep chaos at bay. Currently this is taking them in an increasingly totalitarian direction, but it recognises the challenge of keeping the Communist Party properly motivated by the common good, rather than sinking into corruption, cronyism and bureaucratic protectionism, as totalitarian governments are wont to do. Meanwhile this exists alongside a highly competitive market economy that can only be called capitalist. This is not a settled system but an ongoing struggle. Whether it will succeed in the long term is an open question, but for now it looks strong.
The most important cultural difference between China and the West is that China does not try to export universal ideals. Western civilisation has a strong universalist streak. Christianity is for the whole world. The Enlightenment ideals that evolved into secular liberalism similarly advanced universal values, as did Communism. When Western powers made conquests and colonies, they didn’t just exploit commercial opportunities to extract wealth, they exported Christian missionaries and liberal ideas of constitutional, democratic governance in a mission to “civilise” other cultures. There is a bit of a paradox here: while seeking to export core values, Western powers became more tolerant of cultural diversity. China (like India) is very different: China’s culture is about China, and it has no especial desire to export it across the world. This has led, though, to the current Chinese government trying turn everybody within its borders into cultural Chinese - giving rise to oppressive government in Xinjiang and Tibet. This is critical to understanding the country’s relationships with the rest of the world. The rivalry between the West and China can’t be seen as a life or death struggle for the world, as the Cold War could be (except that the Chinese might see it as a struggle against influences that might crush it). China wants to carve out its sphere and order the rest of the world to its advantage. What the rest of the world does matters little to it, unless it feels its interests are being trampled on. Alas, the more powerful China becomes, the more expansive are its ideas of those interests. The country is also completely unscrupulous in how it advances its interests: it seems quite happy to tolerate organised crime, provided it is other countries that are affected. Bullying other nations is just diplomacy by other means.
So how should we engage with China? I think to some extent we have to copy China’s own game. We have to accept that what China does within its own borders is its business - at governmental level. We shouldn’t stop people in our countries drawing attention to China’s malpractice in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong. We shouldn’t hide our view that we think that China would prosper more in the long term if it took the path of liberalism. But it should not be government business to impose these ideas on China.
China should be no more of a worry than America. That country is retreating from its universalist vision, and is steadily being taken over by a big business oligarchy that simply wants to exploit the rest of the world. If there is an ideology it seems to focus on white ethno-nationalism, an attachment to certain traditional values and to giving big businesses a free hand. They increasingly see Europe as a rival polity to be subdued, as they make their peace with the enormous military power of Russia. Europe will increasingly have to play China off against America - though we can retain more hope that America can change political course than China. There is much more cultural common ground with America after all.
China is at the centre of two big geopolitical issues: climate change and Taiwan. China’s path towards decarbonisation is far too slow, though it has a good chance of exceeding its targets. It clings to its victim-mentality - asking why it should pay such a price to slow its development, when other countries have got ahead. The answer to that, of course, is that its huge size means that no global strategy to reduce and reverse greenhouse gas emissions can work without the country pulling its weight. There are two ways that this might change, and one way that it won’t. The way that it won’t change is if people from the West lecture China on what it should or shouldn’t be doing. The way that it might work is if that lecturing comes from the developing world - the countries with most to lose from climate change. These countries are important to China. The second way China’s attitudes might change is because the country has become world leader in renewable power and battery technology. There is a huge opportunity for it if the world takes a more focused approach to reducing fossil fuel use. The retreat of the US has left a vacuum at the heart of climate-change politics: only China can fill it.
On Taiwan, China is clearly winning its long, patient campaign. America is slowly but surely abandoning its support for an independent Taiwan. It does not want to be drawn into a war to protect it. China needs to find some way of safeguarding America’s commercial interests - and then the door is open. Alas we in Europe are helpless spectators. We have to concentrate on our defence against Russia.
China is not a direct threat to Europe. We should avoid the hysterical narratives that suggest that we are engaged in a Cold War like struggle with it. Engagement with China can be mutually beneficial. At the same time we have to be clear about what China is up to, and how unscrupulously it promotes its interests. We should avoid over dependence - though not get too worried about a degree of trade deficit. With such trade imbalances it is far from clear as to who is exploiting whom. Still the huge Chinese trade surplus is creating international economic stress, without obvious long-term benefit to China. We can make use of Chinese advances in green technologies in our own drive to decarbonise. China might want to exploit any economic dependency, but it will find that much harder in practice than in theory.
Meanwhile, showing a little more respect to China won’t hurt, for all its misbehaviour. It is one of the world’s most preeminent powers, and has been for millennia. It constitutes an important part of human civilisation, and we can learn much from it. We must deal with the world as it is, not as we would like it to be.


To look on the optimistic side of this somewhat grim picture, the unpleasant Chinese imperialism does not strike me as getting very far. The ongoing confrontation with the Moslem community in Xinjiang is imposing a cost on the Chinese state. To its East lies the large Islands in the Pacific – those of Japan and the Philippines amongst others- which it cannot hope to conquer; and its bullying tactics can only evoke resentment. The present confrontation with Japan is a case in point – the result is that Japan is become more assertive..
As this post notes, there is pragmatic scope for working with china on Europe’s common interests with it. One is that China, like us, has an interest in stabilising the political situation there, and so can help counter the destabilising effect of the US’s excessive support for Israel. A second it that they, like us, need an effective system for enabling international trade. It’s just that they disagree on how the international system should work. It is interesting that Xi is reported to have an ascetic streak and to live a relatively modest personal life uninterested in the trappings of power; I would expect there to be a logic about the Chinese position which we can and should work with, even if it is a logic we don’t like.
I can also report on one personal experience. I was lucky enough recently to have a conversation with a Han Chinese lady, now in her mid-forties, who grew up in Bejing the daughter of a university professor. After not getting on with the politics there, she was able to emigrate to the UK when a university student. She said that she and others like her had been supportive of Xi in his bid for leadership in 2013, but they had no idea then that such an autocratic rule would emerge. It was a great let-down. Perhaps quite a few others still in China feel the same? What will follow the 72 year old autocrat? One can but hope not more of the same.